Abstract. In this work, we generalize the paradigm of hash proof system (HPS) proposed by Cramer and Shoup [CS02]. In the central of our generalization, we lift subset membership problem to distribution distinguish problem. Our generalized HPS clarifies and encompass all the known publickey encryption (PKE) schemes that essentially implement the idea of hash proof system. Moreover, besides existing smoothness property, we introduce an additional property named anonymity for HPS. As a natural application, we consider anonymity for PKE in the presence of key-leakage, and provide a generic construction of leakage-resilient anonymous PKE from anonymous HPS. We then extend our generalization to the identity-based setting. Concretely, we generalize the paradigm of identity-based hash proof system (IB-HPS) proposed by Boneh et al.
Introduction

Motivation
In this paper, we focus on the original (IB)-HPS and its application in encryption schemes. While (IB)-HPS can be constructed for languages related to Diffie-Hellman like assumptions (such as DDH, DLIN, and DBDH) and number-theoretic assumptions (such as QR and DCR), it is interesting to realize the difficulty of construct efficient (IB)-HPS for lattice-based assumptions (such as LWE) 1 . The main reason is that the original paradigm of (IB)-HPS insists that L and X\L are disjointed. This requirement works well with the concept of valid ciphertext and invalid ciphertext, and the original paradigm can be interpreted exactly by languages related to DH-like and number-theoretic assumptions (those with precise algebraic property). However, such requirement rules out lattice-based instantiations. We first note that more formally, subset membership problem should be reformulated as distribution distinguish problem, which states that a uniform distribution on L is computationally indistinguishable from a uniform distribution on X\L. We then observe that for most usages of HPS, it is the indistinguishability between two modes (one is for real system and the other is for simulation) that really matters. Hence, the supports of the two distributions are not necessarily disjointed, and the uniform requirement is also not necessary. Moreover, in the original paradigm of HPS the language L is independent of P K, which means that ciphertext is unrelated to the public key. To encompass a broad class of encryption schemes that relying on HPS, L should be viewed as a collection of languages indexed by P K.
The classical security definitions for encryption schemes are mainly concerned with data privacy, that a ciphertext does not reveal the data it encrypts. The well-known notions such as one-wayness (OW) and indistinguishability (IND) are both directed at capturing different levels of data privacy. However, many newly emerged applications such as cloud computing also require key privacy, that is ciphertext does not reveal the key under which it encrypts. The concept of key privacy (or anonymity) was first formalized in the context of symmetric-key encryption [AR02, Des00, Fis99] and was later extended to the context of public-key encryption (PKE) [BBDP01] and identity-based encryption (IBE) [ABC + 05]. It is easy to see that the goals of data privacy and key privacy are orthogonal [BBDP01, ZHI07] . There exist encryption schemes which satisfy the strongest data privacy but still lack the weakest key privacy. For instance, given a PKE scheme with certain level of data privacy, we can construct a variant of it by simply adding the public key to the ciphertexts. The new PKE scheme preserves original data privacy but obviously loses all the key privacy. Similar examples also exists in the identity-based settings, where we just make the identity explicit in the ciphertexts.
Unlike that data privacy has already been extensively studied in the literature, key privacy is comparatively less studied. Recently, researchers start to consider data privacy in the presence of key-leakage attacks, as in real life an adversary might gain some partial information about secret keys, by observing behavior of the protocol executions, or measuring the places where they are stored, via cold-boot attacks, electromagnetic measurements and many more. A large body of work [NS09, ADN + 10, CDRW10, LRW11, CLC11] have already emerged on constructing encryption schemes with data privacy against various key-leakage attacks. However, all these work only focus on classical security (data privacy) but not anonymity (key privacy). On one hand, for encryption schemes derived from (IB)-HPS, while the smooth property of (IB)-HPS implies data privacy, there is no property of (IB)-HPS ready to imply anonymity. On the other 1 We note two exceptions here. Katz and Vaikuntanathan [KV09] hand, we note that (IB)-HPS is one of the two known methodologies 2 to achieve leakageresilience (mainly benefit from the redundancy introduced to the secret key). Hence, we are motivated to seek an additional property for (IB)-HPS which implies anonymity for the resulting encryption schemes, and consider the construction of leakage-resilient anonymous encryption schemes via IB-HPS with such property.
Our Contribution
-Generalize the paradigm of HPS and present a latticed-based instantiation.
-Introduce a new property named anonymity for HPS; formally define the anonymity for PKE in the presence of key-leakage. -Show how to convert smooth and anonymous HPS to leakage-resilient one, and further show how to construct leakage-resilient secure and anonymous PKE. -Generalize the paradigm of identity-based HPS and present six instantiations based on the ideas behind prior IBE schemes. -Introduce a new property named anonymity for IB-HPS; formally define the anonymity for IBE in the presence of key-leakage. -Show how to convert smooth and anonymous IB-HPS to leakage-resilient one, and further show how to construct leakage-resilient secure and anonymous IBE. -Introduce the notion of leakage-resilient security for public-key encryption with keyword search (PEKS), and construct leakage-resilient secure PEKS via leakage-resilient anonymous IBE, which is in turn derived from anonymous IB-HPS.
Definitions and Preliminaries
Notation
For a finite set S, we denote by x R ← − S the action of uniformly choosing an element x from S, and by x, y, z R ← − S the action of independently and uniformly choosing all x, y, z from S. We denote by U S the uniform distribution over S. For an integer n ∈ N, we denote by U n the uniform distribution over {0, 1} n . For a distribution D, we denote by |D| its support, and by x ← D the action of choosing x according to D. Throughout this paper, κ ∈ N denotes the security parameter. We denote by negl(κ) an unspecified function negligible in κ. We use PPT to denote probabilistic polynomial-time. If A is a randomized algorithm, we write z ← A(x 1 , . . . , x n ; r) to indicate that A outputs z on inputs (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and random coins r. Sometimes for brevity, we omit r and write z ← A(x 1 , . . . , x n ) when it is not necessary to make explicit the random coins A uses.
Assumptions
Let BLGroupGen be a PPT algorithm that takes as input a security parameter κ and output a tuple (p, G, G T , e), where p is a κ-bit prime, G and G T are two groups of order p, e is a bilinear map from G × G to G T . The following three assumptions are all defined with respect to parameters (p, G, G T , e) ← BLGroupGen(κ).
Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption. The decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption [BF03] is that the distributions (g, g a , g b , g c , e(g, g) abc ) and (g, g a , g b , g c , Z) are computationally indistinguishable, where
The other is dual encryption system [Wat09] .
Decisional Square Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption. The decisional square bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DSBDH) assumption [Kil07] is that the distributions (g, g a , g b , e(g, g) a 2 b ) and
Decisional Truncated Augmented Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent Assumption. The decisional truncated augmented bilinear Diffie-Hellman exponent (DTABDHE) assumption [Gen06] with respect to q is that the distributions (g , g q+2 , g, g 1 , . . . , g q , e(g q+1 , g )) and (g , g q+2 , g, g 1 , . . . , g q , Z) (here g i and g i denote g α i and g α i ) are computationally indistinguishable, where g, g
Quadratic Residuosity Assumption. Let RSAGen(κ) be a PPT algorithm that generates two κ-bit primes p and q. Decisional Learning With Errors Assumption. For an integer q ≥ 2 and some probability distribution χ over Z q , an integer dimension n ∈ Z + , and a vector s ∈ Z n q , define A s,χ as the distribution over Z n q × Z q of the variable (a, a T s + t) where a R ← − Z n q and t ← χ. The decisional learning with errors (DLWE) assumption is that the distribution A s,χ and the uniform distribution over Z n q × Z q are computationally indistinguishable, where
Min-Entropy and Randomness Extractor
Here we review some concepts related to probability distributions and randomness extractors. The statistical distance between two random variables x, y over a finite domain Ω is defined as SD(x, y) = The min-entropy of a random variable x over a domain Ω is the negative (base-2) logarithm of the predictability of x: H ∞ (x) = − log 2 (max ω∈Ω Pr[x = ω]). In many scenarios, the variable x is correlated with another variable y (define on domain Θ) whose value is known to an adversary. In such scenarios, it is more convenient to use the notion of average min-entropy [DORS08] , which captures the average predictability of x given knowledge of y. This is formally defined as:
The following lemma bound on average min-entropy:
If y takes at most 2 r possible values and z is any random variable, then
In out constructions, we will mainly use strong randomness extractor [Sha02] in the setting of average min-entropy. The precise definition is as follows:
Definition 2.2 A polynomial-time function Ext : Ω → {0, 1} v is an average case (m, )-strong extractor with seeds set S = {0, 1} µ , if for all pairs of random variables (x, y) such that x is distributed over Ω and H ∞ (x|y) ≥ m, s ← U S , r ← U m , we have SD((Ext(x; s), s, y)), (r, s, y)) ≤ .
Leakage Model
So far, there are mainly two leakage models for leakage-resilient cryptographic schemes. One is called the "bounded-leakage model" [AGV09, NS09, ADW09, ADN + 10, CDRW10], which does not restrict the type of leakage, but has to bound the overall amount of leakage. The other is called the "continuous-leakage model" [CDH + 00, MR04, DP08, FKPR10], which only bounds the amount of leakage per period (as opposed to overall) by continually refreshing the secret keys, but has to impose additional non-trivial restrictions on the types of leakage. In this paper, we consider security and anonymity for encryption schemes in the bounded-leakage model.
Generalized Hash Proof System
As we have discussed in the introduction, HPS serves as a good framework to unify many PKE schemes based on decisional assumptions. However, its original definition seems a bit strict to encompass latticed-based PKE schemes which essentially implement the hash proof technique. Aiming for utmost generality, in this work we generalize the original paradigm of HPS. The main difference between our generalization and that of Cramer and Shoup [CS02] is that we introduce distribution distinguish problem instead of subset membership problem. In more details, the distribution distinguish problem can be viewed as a relaxed version of the subset membership problem. The relaxations comes from three aspects: 1) remove the restriction that the supports of two distributions must be disjointed; 2) remove the restriction that the two distributions are both uniform; 3) extend L from a single language to a collection of languages indexed by the set of public keys. Looking ahead, the first and second relaxations admits more natural and efficient constructions for languages related to a broad class of assumptions, while the third relaxation admits more PKE constructions (e.g. the PKE schemes transformed from the IBE schemes presented in [CDRW10, Gen06] ).
Distribution Distinguish Problem (DDP).
A distribution distinguish problem D specifies a collection (D κ ) κ≥0 of distributions. For each security parameter κ ≥ 0, D κ is a probability distribution over problem instance descriptions. Each instance description Γ specifies:
-Finite non-empty sets X, W , P K, and two collections of distributions A = (A pk ) pk∈P K and B = (B pk ) pk∈P K over X. -A collection of binary relations R = (R pk ) pk∈P K defined over X × W . For x ∈ X and w ∈ W and some pk ∈ P K such that (x, w) ∈ R pk , we say that w is a witness for x. We require that for all x ∈ |A pk |, there exists a w ∈ W such that (x, w) ∈ R pk .
We write Γ = (X, W, P K, A, B, R) to indicate that the instance Γ specifies X, W , P K, A, B, and R as above. D also provides the three sampling algorithms below:
-SampDDP(κ): take as input a security parameter κ, output a master public and secret key pair (mpk, msk) and an instance description Γ according to the distribution D κ . Here, mpk will be implicitly used by the following two sampling algorithm. -SampA(pk): output x ← A pk along with a witness w ∈ W such that (x, w) ∈ R pk . This is the sampling with witness algorithm. -SampB(pk): output x ← B pk . This is the sampling without witness algorithm.
We only require algorithms SampDDP and SampA to be efficient. A distribution distinguish problem D is said to be hard if A pk and B pk are computationally indistinguishable for any PPT adversary (a precise definition will be given later).
Projective Hash Family (PHF). Let X, Y , SK, P K be finite non-empty sets, and A be a collection of distributions indexed by P K. Here X, P K, A are defined as in DDP above. Let H = {H sk : X → Y } sk∈SK be a family of functions indexed by SK. Let α : SK → P K be a projection from SK to P K. We say H = (H, SK, P K, X, A, Y, α) a projective hash family (PHF) if for any sk ∈ SK and pk = α(sk), the action of H sk on x ← A pk is approximately determined by α(sk) (in a sense we will make precise below).
Generalized Hash Proof System. A generalized hash proof system P bridges a distribution distinguish problem D and a projective hash family H with the following four algorithms:
-Setup(κ): run SampDDP(κ) to generate a master public/secret key pair (mpk, msk) and an instance description Γ = (X, W, P K, A, B, R) of D, pick a suitable projective hash family H = (H, SK, P K, X, A, Y, α). msk will be implicitly used by the following algorithms. -KeyGen(κ): pick sk R ← − SK, compute pk ← α(sk), and output a public/secret key pair (pk, sk).
-Priv(sk, x): take as input a private key sk and x ∈ X, and output y ∈ Y such that y = H sk (x). This is the private evaluation algorithm. -Pub(pk, x, w): take as input pk and x ∈ |A pk | together with a witness w ∈ W for x, and output y ∈ Y . This is the public evaluation algorithm.
The property of smoothness captures the average-case behavior of H sk on x ← B pk .
Definition 3.4 (Anonymity) A HPS is -anonymous if:
where R is the ensemble of (mpk, msk). The probability is taken over the choice of
Moreover, a HPS is -leakage-resilient -anonymous if for any function f 0 (·) and f 1 (·) with -bit output:
The property of anonymity captures the behavior of SampB from pairwise aspect.
Generic Construction of Leakage-Resilient HPS
We now show how to convert a HPS (Setup, KeyGen, Pub, Priv) into a leakage-resilient one using an average-case randomness extractor Ext : Y → {0, 1} v with seeds set S = {0, 1} µ . We slightly modify the algorithms SampA and SampB of D as follows:
-SampA(pk): sample (x, w) ← SampA(pk), pick a seed s R ← − {0, 1} µ , and outputx = (x, s).
-SampB(pk): sample x ← SampB(pk), pick a seed s R ← − {0, 1} µ , and outputx = (x, s).
We keep algorithms Setup and KeyGen unchanged, define:
, and outputȳ ← Ext(y; s).
-Pub(pk,x, w): parsex as (x, s), compute y ← Pub(pk, x, w), and outputȳ ← Ext(y; s).
The theorem below shows that the transformed HPS (Setup, KeyGen, Pub, Priv) is leakageresilient for appropriate parameters. Proof. The smoothness of the underlying HPS means SD((R, pk, x, y), (R, pk, x, y )) ≤ 1 , which implies H ∞ (y|(R, pk, x)) ≈ log 2 |Y | = m. In the presence of leakage, an adversary can obtain at most bits of leakage from the private key sk (modelled as a random variable f (sk) with 2 values). By Lemma 2.1 we have
The leakage-resilient smoothness of the resulting HPS immediately follows the fact that s is independently chosen from {0, 1} µ , that is:
This part of theorem has been implicitly implied in [NS09] .
Next we prove the leakage-resilient anonymity of the resulting HPS. We first apply the leakage-resilient smooth property twice:
Note that (pk 0 , sk 0 ) and (pk 1 , sk 1 ) are independently generated by KeyGen(κ), then we have:
The anonymity of the underlying HPS means SD((R, pk 0 , pk 1 , x 0 , y 0 ), (R, pk 0 , pk 1 , x 1 , y 1 )) ≤ 2 , thus certainly SD((R, pk 0 , pk 1 , x 0 ), (R, pk 0 , pk 1 , x 1 )) ≤ 2 . The fact that s
Note that conditioned on fixed pk 0 and pk 1 , f 0 (sk 0 ) and f 1 (sk 1 ) are independent ofx 0 ,x 1 , we then arrive at:
The leakage-resilient anonymity of the resulting HPS immediately follows by combining the inequalities 1, 2, 3, that is:
This proves the theorem.
Leakage-Resilient PKE
A PKE scheme consists of three PPT algorithms as below:
-KeyGen(κ): take as input a security parameter κ, output a public/secret key pair (pk, sk). Let M be the message space, and C be the ciphertext space. -Encrypt(pk, m): take as input a public key pk and a message m ∈ M , output a ciphertext c.
-Decrypt(sk, c): take as input a secret key sk and a ciphertext c ∈ C, output a message m or a reject symbol ⊥ indicating c is invalid.
The correctness of PKE requires that for any message m ∈ M , we have:
where the probability is taken over the random coins used by KeyGen and Encrypt.
Security. The data privacy we consider for PKE is leakage-resilient IND-CPA security in the bounded-leakage model. Advantage of an adversary A is defined as:
where O leak (sk, ·) is an oracle that on input a function f : SK → {0, 1} * , returns f (sk). We say A an -leakage adversary if the sum of output length of all functions that it submits to the leakage oracle O leak (sk, ·) is less than . A PKE scheme is said to be -leakage-resilient IND-CPA secure if for any PPT -leakage adversary A, its advantage defined as above is negligible in κ.
Anonymity. The key privacy we consider for PKE is leakage-resilient ANO-CPA anonymity in the bounded-retrieval model. Advantage of an adversary A is defined as:
where O leak (sk, ·) is an oracle that on input a function f : SK → {0, 1} * , returns f (sk). We say A an -leakage adversary if the sum of output length of all functions that it submits to the leakage oracle O leak (sk 0 , ·) and O leak (sk 1 , ·) are both less than . A PKE scheme is said to be -leakage-resilient ANO-CPA anonymous if for any PPT -leakage adversary A, its advantage defined as above is negligible in κ.
The construction of a leakage-resilient PKE from a leakage-resilient HPS is straightforward. Starting from a leakage-resilient HPS where the hash value set Y has some group structure (Y, +) (e.g. bit-strings with "exclusive or" ⊕), we can construct a PKE scheme with the common public parameters mpk and the message set M = Y by simply using the hashing value as one-time-pad to mask message. More precisely:
-KeyGen(κ): the same as that in HPS.
-Encrypt(pk, m): (x, w) ← SampA(pk), compute y ← Pub(pk, x, w), set z = y +m, and output c = (x, z). -Decrypt(sk, c): parse c as (x, z), compute y ← Priv(sk, c), and output m = z − y.
The correctness of the resulting PKE scheme follows from the projective property of the starting HPS. Note that the algorithm SampB is not used in the construction of PKE, but it will be used to establish security. Proof. The proof of this theorem is rather straightforward and follows from the same argument presented in [CS02, NS09] .
Theorem 4.2 The above construction yields an -leakage-resilient ANO-CPA anonymous PKE if the underlying HPS is -leakage-resilient anonymous.
Proof. We proceed via a sequence of games.
Game 0: Define Game 0 as the leakage-resilient anonymous game for PKE. In the challenge stage of Game 0, upon receiving a message m submitted by the adversary, the challenger picks a random bit b and computes c b ← Encrypt(pk b , m). We expands c b as (x b , z b ) where: 
The difference between Game 0 an Game 1 is only usingỹ b in the place of y b . By the approximate projection of the underlying HPS, the probabilityỹ b = y b is negligible in κ. Thereby, Game 0 and Game 1 are indistinguishable.
Game 2: Based on Game 1, we further modify the challenge stage by letting the challenger generate the ciphertext c b = (x b , z b ) as follows:
We argue that Game 1 and Game 2 are computationally indistinguishable by the indistinguishability of the underlying IB-HPS. Although the definition of indistinguishability does not explicitly embody private key leakage queries, it allows the adversary to learn the entire private keys. Therefore, Game 1 and Game 2 are indistinguishable even if the adversary obtains the entire information of private keys for the two target public keys, and thus certainly being indistinguishable when the adversary is only given limited amount of leakage.
According to the -leakage-resilient anonymous property of HPS, the advantage of any PPT adversary in Game 2 is negligible. Therefore the advantage of any PPT adversary in Game 0 is also negligible in κ, which concludes the Theorem 4.2.
Instantiations of HPS
Previous constructions of HPS based on a variety of assumptions [CS02, NS09] can also be explained in the paradigm of generalized HPS without any difficulty. To avoid repetition, we only present a construction of HPS based on the DLWE assumption, which does not fit the original paradigm.
HPS based on the DLWE Assumption
We now describe a HPS based on the DLWE assumption, which can be viewed as the backbone of the PKE scheme presented in [GPV08] .
Let D be a distribution distinguish problem based on the DLWE assumption. SampDDP(κ) generates A ∈ Z n×m q along with a trapdoor S ⊂ Λ ⊥ (A, q) according to the trapdoor generation algorithm of [GPV08] , and a function f indexed by A, sets mpk = (A, f A ) and msk = S; outputs an instance description Γ = (X, W, P K, A, B, R) of D, where
, w)} where t ∈ χ m , v ∈ Z p }, two collections of distributions A and B are specified by SampA and SampB as follows:
In this case, A pk , B pk , and R pk are the same for all pk ∈ P K. We then write A, B, and R for simplicity. Let H = (H, SK, P K, X, Y, A, α) be a corresponding projective hash family, where SK = Z m q , Y = Z 2 × Z q , X, P K, and A are defined as above. For x = (p, v), we define H sk (x) = y as y = 1 if |v − sk T p| ≤ q−1 4 and y = 0 otherwise. Let P be an HPS for D associating H, which consists of four algorithms as below:
-Setup(κ): run SampDDP(κ) to generate mpk = (A, f A ) and msk = S.
-KeyGen(κ): choose an error vector according to D Z m q ,r as the secret key sk, set the public key pk to be f A (sk).
4 then output y = 1 else output y = 0. As shown in [GPV08] , the above HPS is smooth and anonymous.
Generalized Identity-Based Hash Proof System
The paradigm of IB-HPS has appeared in different forms in previous literature [BGH07, ADN + 10]. In [BGH07] , IB-HPS is viewed as HPS with trapdoor. However, their definition inherently relates to the original SMP, hence is not generic enough to encompass all the IBE schemes relying on hash proof techniques, e.g. the IBE schemes presented in [Gen06, CDRW10] . In [ADN + 10], IB-HPS is viewed as IB-KEM with some special algebraic properties. Although their definition extended the original SMP by making the encapsulation algorithms take a public key as input, they still retained the "disjointed" requirement by equipping with valid and invalid encapsulation. In [ADN + 10], they also introduced a property called "anonymous-encapsulation". Briefly, anonymous-encapsulation requires that there exists an efficient and equivalent encapsulation algorithm that can generate the ciphertext and the DEM key without knowing the intended identity. As they summarized, the anonymity-encapsulation property brings two advantages. Firstly, IB-HPS with such property immediately implies anonymous IBE, in that the ciphertext does not contain any information of the intended identity. Secondly, IB-HPS with such property allows the resulting leakage-amplification scheme to greatly reduce the ciphertext size by adapting the standard randomness reuse trick (here witness serves as randomness). We remark that anonymous-encapsulation of IB-HPS is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for anonymity of the resulting IBE. For instance, as we will see in subsection 8.4, Gentry IBE [Gen06] is anonymous but its underlying IB-HPS does not satisfy anonymous-encapsulation property.
In what follows, parallel to what we did in section 3, we generalize the paradigm of IB-HPS. and then introduce a property named anonymity to serve as a sufficient and necessary condition for anonymity of the resulting IBE. As we will see later, our paradigm of anonymous (IB)-HPS serves as a good framework to explain all the known anonymous encryption schemes [Gen06, BGH07, GPV08, Cor09] that rely on hash proof technique, either in the random oracle model or in the standard model.
Definition of Generalized IB-HPS
The definition of distribution distinguish problem and projective hash family are the same as that of HPS. An identity-based hash proof system (IB-HPS) P bridges DDP D and PHF H with the following four algorithms:
-Setup(κ): the same as that in HPS; in addition, it aslo specifies an identity set I, a function IHF : I → P K, and requires that α can be efficiently inverted with msk. We denote its inverse function by σ(msk, ·), which satisfies α(σ(msk, pk)) = pk for any pk ∈ P K. -KeyGen(msk, id): take as input msk and id ∈ I, and output sk ← σ(msk, IHF(id)).
-Priv(sk, x): the same as that in HPS. This is the private evaluation algorithm.
-Pub(id, x, w): take as input id ∈ I, x ∈ L pk (where pk = IHF(id)) and a witness w ∈ W for x, and output y ∈ Y . This is the public evaluation algorithm.
We then define the indistinguishability, (approximate) projection, smoothness, and anonymity for IB-HPS. Unless otherwise indicated, all the following properties are defined in the probability space of generating (mpk, msk) honestly by SampDDP(κ).
Definition 6.1 (Indistinguishability) An IB-HPS satisfies the indistinguishability if for any PPT adversary A and any id ∈ I,
where pk = IHF(id), O reveal (·) is an oracle that on input of id ∈ I, returns sk ← KeyGen(msk, id). The probability is taken over the choice of (mpk, msk) ← SampDDP(κ).
Definition 6.2 (Projection) An IB-HPS is projective if for any id ∈ I:
where w is a witness for x. The probability is taken over the choice of x ← A pk (pk = IHF(id)) and sk ← KeyGen(msk, id).
Definition 6.3 (Smoothness) An IB-HPS is -smooth if for any id ∈ I:
where R is the ensemble of (mpk, msk) and the private keys for identities other than id. The probability is taken over the choice of x ← B pk for pk ← IHF(id), y ← Priv(sk, x) (sk ← KeyGen(msk, id)), and y ← U Y . Moreover, an IB-HPS is -leakage-resilient -smooth if for any function f (·) with -bit output:
Definition 6.4 (Anonymity) An IB-HPS is -anonymous if for any two distinct id 0 , id 1 ∈ I:
where R is the ensemble of (mpk, msk) and the private keys for identities other than id 0 and id 1 . The probability is taken over the choice of
, Moreover, an IB-HPS is -leakage-resilient -anonymous if, for any function f 0 (·) and f 1 (·) with -bit output, we have:
The generic construction of leakage-resilient IB-HPS from IB-HPS and the generic construction of leakage-resilient IBE from leakage-resilient IB-HPS are similar to that in PKE setting. For completeness, we present the technical details as below.
Generic Construction of Leakage-Resilient IB-HPS
We now show a generic construction of leakage-resilient IB-HPS, which is almost the same as that presented in [ADN + 10, Section 3.2]. Starting from an IB-HPS (Setup, KeyGen, Pub, Priv), the construction converts it to a leakage-resilient IB-HPS using an average-case randomness extractor Ext : Y → {0, 1} v with seeds set {0, 1} µ . We slightly modify the algorithms SampA and SampB of D as follows:
-SampA(pk): sample (x, w) ← SampA(pk), pick a seed s R ← − {0, 1} µ , and outputx = (x, s). -SampB(pk): sample x ← SampB(pk), pick a seed s R ← − {0, 1} µ , and outputx = (x, s).
-Priv(sk,x): parsex as (x, s), compute y ← Priv(id, x), and outputȳ = Ext(y; s).
-Pub(id,x, w): parsex as (x, s), compute y ← Pub(id, x, w), and outputȳ = Ext(y; s).
The theorem below shows that the transformed IB-HPS (Setup, KeyGen, Pub, Priv) is leakageresilient smooth and anonymous for appropriate parameters.
Theorem 6.5 Assume that an IB-HPS is 1 -smooth and 2 -anonymous and |Y | = 2 m . Let Ext : Y → {0, 1} v be an (m − , ext ) average-case randomness extractor. Then the above transform produces an -leakage-resilient ( 1 + ext )-smooth and ( 2 + 2 ext )-anonymous IB-HPS.
Proof. The smoothness of the underlying IB-HPS means that SD((R, id, x, y), (R, id, x, y )) ≤ 1 , which implies H ∞ (y|(R, id, x)) ≈ log 2 |Y | = m. In the presence of leakage, an adversary has access to at most bits of leakage from the private key sk (modelled as a random variable f (sk) with 2 values). By Lemma 2.1 we know that H ∞ (y|(R, f (sk), id, x)) ≈ H ∞ (y|(R, f (sk), id, x))− = m − , therefore according to the definition of a (m − , ext ) randomness extractor, we have SD((R, id, f (sk), x,ȳ), (R, id, f (sk), x,ȳ )) ≤ 1 + ext . The leakage-resilient smoothness of the resulting IB-HPS follows from the fact that s is chosen independently from {0, 1} µ , that is:
This part of theorem has been proved in another way in [ADN + 10].
Next we prove leakage-resilient anonymity of the resulting IB-HPS. For any two distinct identities id 0 , id 1 ∈ I, denote by R 0 (resp. R 1 ) the ensemble of mpk, msk, and the private keys for identities other than sk 0 (resp. sk 1 ). We first apply the leakage-resilient smooth property twice:
Note that sk 1 ∈ R 0 and sk 0 ∈ R 1 , we have:
Note the fact that R ⊂ R 0 and R ⊂ R 1 , then we get:
The anonymity of the underlying IB-HPS indicates SD((R, id 0 , id 1 , x 0 , y 0 ), (R, id 0 , id 1 , x 1 , y 1 )) ≤ 2 and thus certainly SD((R, id 0 , id 1 , x 0 ), (R, id 0 , id 1 , x 1 )) ≤ 2 . The fact that s R ← − {0, 1} µ and y R ← − {0, 1} v are independent of x 0 , x 1 implies SD((R, id 0 , id 1 ,x 0 ,ȳ ), (R, id 0 , id 1 ,x 1 ,ȳ )) ≤ 1 . Note that conditioned on fixed id 0 and id 1 , f 0 (sk 0 ) and f 1 (sk 1 ) are independent ofx 0 ,x 1 , we arrive at:
Finally, the desired leakage-resilient anonymity of the IB-HPS immediately follows by combining the inequalities 4, 5, 6, that is:
Leakage-Resilient IBE
An IBE scheme [BF03] consists of four PPT algorithms as below:
-Setup(κ): take as input a security parameter κ, output a master public/secret key pair (mpk, msk). Let I be the identity space, M be the message space, and C be the ciphertext space. mpk will be used as an implicit input for algorithms Extract, Encrypt, and Decrypt, -KeyGen(msk, id): take as input msk and an identity id ∈ I, output a private key sk.
-Encrypt(id, m): take as input mpk, an identity id ∈ I, and a message m ∈ M , output a ciphertext c ∈ C. -Decrypt(sk, c): take as input a private key sk and a ciphertext c ∈ C, output a message m ∈ M or a reject symbol ⊥ indicating c is invalid.
The correctness of IBE requires that for any id ∈ I and any m ∈ M , we have:
where the probability is taken over random coins used by Setup, KeyGen, and Encrypt.
Security. The data privacy we consider for IBE is leakage-resilient IND-CPA security in the bounded-leakage model. Advantage of an adversary A is defined as:
where O reveal (·) is an oracle that on input id, returns sk ← KeyGen(msk, id), O leak (·, ·) is an oracle that on input id and a function f : SK → {0, 1} * , returns f (sk). The restrictions are that the reveal oracle is only available for identities other than id * , and after seeing the challenge ciphertext c * the leak oracle is only available for identities other than id * . We say A anleakage adversary if the sum of output length of all functions that it submits to the leakage oracle O leak (id, ·) for any single id ∈ I is less than . An IBE scheme is said to be -leakageresilient IND-CPA secure if for any PPT -leakage adversary A, its advantage defined as above is negligible in κ.
Anonymity. The key privacy we consider for IBE is leakage-resilient ANO-CPA security in the bounded-leakage model. Advantage of an adversary A is defined as:
where O reveal (·) and O leak (·, ·) oracles are defined as above. The restrictions are that the reveal oracle is only available for identities other than id 0 , id 1 , and after seeing the challenge ciphertext c * the leak oracle is only available for identities other than id 0 , id 1 . We say A an -leakage adversary if the sum of output length of all functions that it submits to the leakage oracle O leak (id, ·) for any single id ∈ I is less than . An IBE scheme is said to be -leakage-resilient ANO-CPA anonymous if for any PPT -leakage adversary A, its advantage defined as above is negligible in κ.
Remark 1. Our notion of leakage-resilience only allows leakage on single private key for each identity, but not on master secret key.
We next show a natural construction of leakage-resilient IBE from IB-HPS, which is almost the same to the construction presented in [ADN + 10, Section 4.2]. More precisely, given an IB-HPS where the hashing value set Y has some group structure (Y, +) (e.g. bit-strings with "exclusive or" ⊕), one can construct an IBE with identity set I and message set M = Y by simply using the hashing value as one-time-pad to mask a message.. The algorithms Setup and KeyGen are identical to that of IB-HPS. The algorithms Encrypt and Decrypt are constructed as follows:
-Encrypt(id, m): compute pk ← IHF(id), (x, w) ← SampA(pk), y ← Pub(id, x, w), set z = y + m, and output c = (x, z). -Decrypt(sk, c): parse c as (x, z), compute y ← Priv(sk, x), and output m = z − y.
The correctness of the resulting PKE scheme follows from the projective property of the starting HPS. Note that the algorithm SampB of the IB-HPS is not used in the construction, but will be used to argue security. Theorem 7.2 The above construction yields an -leakage-resilient anonymous IBE if the underlying IB-HPS is -leakage-resilient anonymous.
Proof. We proceed via a sequence of games. 
The difference between Game 0 an Game 1 is only the use ofỹ b versus y b . By the approximate correctness of evaluation,ỹ b = y b happens with negligible probability, so Game 0 and Game 1 are indistinguishable. Game 2: Based on Game 1, we further modify the challenge stage by having the challenger generate the ciphertext c b = (x b , z b ) as follows:
We claim that Game 1 and Game 2 are computationally indistinguishable by the distribution indistinguishability of the underlying IB-HPS. Note that, although the definition of distribution indistinguishability does not explicitly embody private key leakage queries, it allows the adversary to learn all private keys. Therefore indistinguishability between Game 1 and Game 2 holds even if the adversary obtains the entire information of private keys for the two target identities, and hence certainly holds when just given limited amount of leakage.
According to the -leakage-resilient anonymous property of IB-HPS, the advantage of any PPT adversary in Game 2 is negligible. Therefore the advantage of any PPT adversary in Game 0 is also negligible in κ, which concludes the Theorem 7.2.
Instantiations of IB-HPS
IB-HPS is known to exist based on a variety of assumptions [ADN + 10]. We first describe a construction of IB-HPS which is smooth but not anonymous, then describe five constructions of IB-HPS which are smooth and anonymous. We note that the last three constructions have been presented in [ADN + 10]. For completeness, we interpret them using our generalized paradigm.
IB-HPS Based on the DBDH Assumption
We now describe an IB-HPS based on the DBDH assumption, which can be viewed as the backbone of the IBE scheme presented in [CDRW10] . Let D be a distribution distinguish problem based on the DBDH assumption. SampDDP(κ)
, w)}, two collections of distributions A and B are specified by SampA and SampB below:
-SampA(pk): pick w R ← − Z p , output x = (pk w , g w , e(g, g) abw ) ← A pk and w ∈ W .
-SampB(pk): pick w, w
Let H = (H, SK, P K, X, A, Y, α) be a corresponding projective hash family, where
For sk = (sk 1 , sk 2 , sk 3 ) and x = (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ), we define H as H sk (x) = e(x 1 , sk 3 )e(x 2 , sk 2 )x sk 1 3 . Let P be an IB-HPS for D associating H, which consists of four algorithms as below:
-Setup(κ): run SampDDP(κ) to generate mpk = (g, u 0 , u 1 , . . . , u n , e(g, g) ab , e(g, g) cd ) and msk = (g ab , g cd ); set the identity set I to be Z p , construct IHF :
(known as the Waters hash [Wat05] ) where id i denotes the i-th bit of identity id; σ(msk, pk) is constructed as: parse msk as (msk 1 , msk 2 ), pick t, r R ← − Z p , output (t, msk 1 msk −t 2 pk r , g −r ). -KeyGen(msk, id): compute pk ← IHF(id), output sk ← σ(msk, pk).
-Pub(id, x, w): compute pk ← IHF(id), for x = (pk w , g w , e(g, g) abw ) output y = e(g, g) cdw .
-Priv(sk, x): parse sk as (sk 1 , sk 2 , sk 3 ) and x as (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ), output y = e(x 1 , sk 3 )e(x 2 , sk 2 )x sk 1 3 .
It is obvious that one can use the bilinear map as a tool to test if an invalid sample x is generated by SampB with respect to pk. Therefore the above IB-HPS is smooth but not anonymous. This provides us an evidence that for IB-HPS smoothness does not guarantee anonymity.
IB-HPS Based on the DSBDH Assumption
We now describe an IB-HPS based on the DSBDH assumption, which can be viewed as the backbone of the first IBE scheme presented in [Cor09] .
Let D be a distribution distinguish problem based on the DSBDH assumption. SampDDP(κ)
runs BLGroupGen(κ) to generate PP = (e, G, G T , p), picks g R ← − G * , a R ← − Z p , sets mpk = (g, g 1 = g a ) and msk = a; outputs an instance description Γ = (X, W, P K, A, B, R) of D, where ((g w , e(g 1 , g 1 ) w ), w)}, two collections of distributions A and B are defined by SampA and SampB as below:
In this case, A pk , B pk , and R pk are the same for all pk ∈ P K. We then write A, B, and R for simplicity.
Let H = (H, SK, P K, X, A, Y, α) be a corresponding projective hash family, where SK = Z p × G, Y = G T . For sk = (sk 1 , sk 2 ) and x = (x 1 , x 2 ), H is defined as H sk (x) = e(x 1 , sk 2 )x sk 1 2 . Let P be an IB-HPS for D associating H, which consists of four algorithms as below:
-Setup(κ): run SampDDP(κ) to generate mpk = (g, g 1 = g a ) and msk = a. The identity set I is {0, 1} * and IHF is a random oracle from {0, 1} * to G. σ(msk, pk) is constructed as: pick
-Pub(id, x, w): compute pk ← IHF(id), for x = (g w , e(g 1 , g 1 ) w ) output y = e(pk, g 1 ) w .
-Priv(sk, x): parse sk as (sk 1 , sk 2 ) and x as (x 1 , x 2 ), output y = e(x 1 , sk 2 )x sk 1 2 . The above IB-HPS is smooth and anonymous.
IB-HPS Based on the DBDH Assumption
We now describe an IB-HPS based on the DBDH assumption, which can be viewed as the backbone of the second IBE scheme presented in [Cor09] .
Let D be a distribution distinguish problem based on the DBDH assumption. SampDDP(κ) , e(g 1 , g 2 ) w ), w)}, two collections of distributions A and B are defined by SampA and SampB as below:
-Setup(κ): run SampDDP(κ) to generate mpk = (g, g 1 = g a , g 2 ), msk = a; set the identity set I to be {0, 1} * , model IHF as a random oracle from {0, 1} * to G. σ(msk, pk) is constructed
-Pub(id, x, w): compute pk ← IHF(id), for x = (g w , e(g 1 , g 2 ) w ) output y = e(pk, g 1 ) w .
-Priv(sk, x): parse sk as (sk 1 , sk 2 ) and x as (x 1 , x 2 ), output y = e(x 1 , sk 2 )x sk 1 2 . As shown in [Cor09] , the above IB-HPS is smooth and anonymous.
IB-HPS Based on the DTABDHE Assumption
We now describe an IB-HPS based on the DTABDHE assumption [Gen06] , which can be viewed as the backbone of Gentry's IBE [Gen06] .
Let D be a distribution distinguish problem based on the DTABDHE assumption. SampDDP(κ)
runs BLGroupGen(κ) to generate PP = (e, G, G T , p), picks g, h ← G * and a R ← − Z p , sets mpk = (g, g 1 = g a , h) and msk = a; outputs an instance description Γ = (X, W, P K, A, B, R) of D, where
, w)}, two collections of distributions A and B are defined by SampA and SampB as below:
-Setup(κ): run SampDDP(κ) to generate mpk = (g, g 1 = g a , h) and msk = a; set the identity set I to be Z p , IHF is an identity function. σ(msk, pk) is constructed as: pick t ∈ Z p , output (t, (hg −t ) 1/(msk−pk) ). -KeyGen(msk, id): set pk = id, output σ(msk, pk).
-Pub(id, x, w): set pk = id, for x = (g w 1 g −w·pk , e(g, g) w ) output y = e(g, h) −w . -Priv(sk, x): parse sk = (sk 1 , sk 2 ) and x = (x 1 , x 2 ), output y = e(x 1 , sk 2 )x sk 1 2 .
As shown in [Gen06] , the above IB-HPS is smooth and anonymous.
IB-HPS Based on the QR Assumption
We now describe an IB-HPS based on the QR assumption, which can be viewed as the backbone of the IBE scheme presented in [BGH07] .
Let D be a distribution distinguish problem based on the QR assumption. SampDDP(κ) runs RSAGen(κ) to generate two primes p and q, sets mpk = (N, u, Q) (where N = pq and 
), w)}, two collections of distributions A and B are specified by SampA and SampB as below:
-SampA(pk): pick w R ← − Z p , set x 1 = w 2 , run Q(N, u, 1, x 1 ) to obtain τ and compute x 2 = τ (w) N , output x = (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ X and w ∈ W .
-SampB(pk):
Let H = (H, SK, P K, X, A, Y, α) be a corresponding projective hash family, where SK = Z N , Y = {±1}. For sk = r and x = (x 1 , x 2 ), H sk (x) = y is defined as when r 2 = pk output
N , where f ,f are the polynomials output by Q(N, u, R, x 1 ). Let P be an IB-HPS for D associating H, which consists of four algorithms as below:
-Setup(κ): run SampDDP(κ) to generate mpk = (N = pq, u, Q) and msk = (p, q); set the identity set I to be {0, 1} * and IHF is a random oracle from {0, 1} * to J(N ). σ(msk, pk) is constructed as: let a ∈ {0, 1} be the unique choice for which u a pk ∈ QR(N ), let {r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , r 4 } be the four square-roots of u a pk so that r 1 < r 2 < r 3 < r 4 (in Z N ) and r 1 = −r 4 , r 2 = −r 3 , output r R ← − {r 1 , r 2 }. -KeyGen(msk, id): compute pk = IHF(id), output sk = α(msk, pk).
-Pub(id, x, w): compute pk = IHF(id), for x = (x 1 , x 2 ), run Q(N, u, pk, x 1 ) to obtain a polynomial g, output y = g(w)
N . -Priv(sk, x): suppose sk = r for id and x = (x 1 , x 2 ), compute pk = IHF(id), run Q(N, u, pk, x 1 ) to obtain polynomials f ,f . If r 2 = pk output y = f (r)
N , else output y = x 2 f (r)
N . As shown in [BGH07] , the above IB-HPS is smooth and anonymous.
IB-HPS Based on the DLWE Assumption
We now describe an IB-HPS based on the DLWE assumption, which can be viewed as the backbone of the IBE scheme presented in [GPV08] .
The distribution distinguish problem D and the projective hash family H are the same as that in HPS defined in subsection 5.1.
Let P be an IB-HPS for D associating H, which consists of four algorithms as below:
Setup(κ): run SampDDP(κ) to generate mpk = (A, f A ) and msk = S. The identity set I is {0, 1} * and the identity mapping function IHF is a random oracle from {0, 1} * to Z n q . The inversion of α is constructed as σ(msk, pk) = f −1 A (pk) using the preimage sampler with msk = S. KeyGen(msk, id): compute pk ← IHF(id), output sk ← σ(msk, pk).
4 then set y = 1 else set y = 0.
As shown in [GPV08] , the above IB-HPS is smooth and anonymous.
Leakage-Resilient Public-Key Encryption with Keyword Search
Public-key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) [BCOP04] is a useful primitive to provide the functionality of "searching on encrypted data" for public-key encryption (PKE). It allows one to delegate his searching ability on encrypted data to a third party without impacting the data privacy and the keyword privacy.
A PEKS scheme [BCOP04] consists of four PPT algorithms as below:
-Setup(κ): take as input a security parameter κ, output a public/secret key pair (pk A , sk A ). Let the keyword space be W , the token space be T . -PEKS(pk A , w): take as input a public key pk A and a keyword w, output a searchable encryption s. -TokenGen(sk A , w): take as input a secret key sk A and a keyword w, output a token t w .
-Test(t w , s): take as input a public key pk, a searchable encryption s, output a bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
The correctness of PEKS requires that for any w ∈ W , we have:
where the probability is taken over the random coins used by Setup, PEKS, and ToeknGen. On the other hand, the consistency of PEKS requires that Test outputs 0 with overwhelmingly probability if s is not an encryption of w.
Leakage Model for PEKS
Intuitively, a PEKS scheme is said to be secure if no PPT adversary cannot distinguish the keyword under which a ciphertext was generated. Boneh et al. [BCOP04] formally defined the security of PKES under chosen-plaintext attack in the traditional sence. However, there is no work considering the security of PEKS in the presence of leakage.
In what follows, we define the leakage-resilient security of PEKS by modifying the usual security game of PEKS (against chosen-plaintext attack) appropriately in the bounded-leakage model. Informally speaking, a PEKS scheme is leakage-resilient secure if it retains security even an adversary can obtain partial information about the tokens of the keywords.
We consider the security for PEKS against chosen-plaintext attack in the presence of token leakage. Advantage of an adversary A is defined as:
where O reveal (·) is an oracle that on input w, returns t w ← TokenGen(sk A , w), O leak (·, ·) is an oracle that on input w and a function f : T → {0, 1} * , returns f (t w ). The restrictions are that the reveal oracle is only available for keywords other than w 0 , w 1 , and after seeing the challenge ciphertext s * the leak oracle is only available for keywords other than w 0 , w 1 . We say A an -leakage adversary if the sum of output length of all functions that it submits to the leakage oracle O leak (w, ·) for any single w ∈ W is less than . An PEKS scheme is said to be -leakage-resilient IND-CPA secure if for any PPT -leakage adversary A, its advantage defined as above is negligible in κ. -PEKS.Setup(κ): run (mpk, msk) ← IBE.Setup(κ), set pk A = mpk, sk A = msk, return the key pair (pk A , sk A ). -PEKS.Encrypt(pk A , w): pick s 1 R ← − M (here M is message set of the underlying IBE scheme), compute s 2 ← IBE.Encrypt(w, s 1 ) where w serves as the identity, return the searchable encryption s = (s 1 , s 2 ).
Generic Construction of Leakage-Resilient PEKS
-PEKS.TokenGen(sk A , w): run IBE.KeyGen(sk A , w) to obtain a private key sk w for "identity" w, return t w = sk w . -PEKS.Test(pk A , s, t w ): parse s = (s 1 , s 2 ), decide if s 1 = IBE.Decrypt(s 2 , t w ). If so, return 1.
Otherwise, return 0.
Leakage-Resilient PEKS from Leakage-Resilient IBE. Be aware of the close resemblance between the (leakage-resilient) security game for PEKS and (leakage-resilient) anonymity game for IBE, leakage-resilient anonymous IBE is likely to imply leakage-resilient secure PEKS. We formally capture this intuition by the following theorem.
Theorem 9.1 For PEKS scheme constructed from IBE scheme via the new BDOP transform, if the IBE scheme is -leakage-resilient ANO-CPA anonymous, then the resulting PEKS scheme is -leakage-resilient IND-CPA secure.
Proof. The proof of this theorem is rather straightforward. Suppose A is an -leakage adversary against the security of the PEKS scheme, we can create an -leakage adversary B against the anonymity of the underlying IBE scheme. B interacts with its own challenger CH in a leakageresilient anonymity game of IBE, and at the same time plays the role of a challenger for A in a leakage-resilient security game of PEKS as below.
Setup: B is given mpk of the underlying IBE scheme. B forwards it to A as the public key pk A . Phase 1: Upon receiving the token reveal queries and test leakage queries issued by A, B responds as follows:
-Token reveal query w : B issues the private key reveal query for "identity" w to its own challenger CH and forwards the reply to A. -Token leakage query w, f i : B issues the private key leak query w, f i to its own challenger CH and forwards the reply to A.
Challenge: When A outputs two keywords w 0 and w 1 where it wants to be challenged on, B picks m R ← − M , then sends it with w 0 and w 1 (serve as two target identities) to CH. When B obtains the challenge ciphertext c = IBE.Encrypt(mpk, w b , m), it sends s = (c, m) to A as the challenge. Phase 2: A may issue more token reveal and token leakage queries with the restriction that they are not related to either w 0 or w 1 . B responds the same way as in Phase 1. Guess: As soon as A outputs its guess b for b, B outputs b to its own challenger.
It is easy to see that B provides a perfect simulation for A, so B has the same advantage against the -leakage anonymity of the underlying IBE scheme as A wins the above game. Theorem 9.1 immediately follows.
Remark 2. The leakage model for PEKS defined in subsection 9.1 only allows leakage on one token for each keyword. It can be further strengthened to allow leakage on several tokens for each keyword as well as the user's private key. Notice the correspondence between PEKS and IBE indicated by the new BDOP transform, one can immediately construct a PEKS scheme that can tolerate leakage on several tokens per keyword as well as the user's private key from an anonymous IBE scheme that allows leakage on several private keys for each identity as well as the master secret key. Recently, Lewko et al. [LRW11] presented the first IBE scheme which can tolerate leakage leakage on several keys for each identity as well as leakage on the master secret key from dual system encryption. However, it is not anonymous.
Concluding Remarks
The role of master secret key. Firstly, we highlight some subtle details in our generalization of (IB)-HPS. In the definition of HPS and IB-HPS, we make explicit the master secret key msk, though it is not used in the algorithms of HPS. From narrative aspect, this treatment allows us to describe HPS and IB-HPS in a unified manner. From technical aspect, this treatment allows us to define (leakage-resilient) smoothness and anonymity for (IB)-HPS as strong as possible. In fact, we requires (leakage-resilient) smoothness and anonymity hold even the adversary can obtain the entire information of msk. Such strengthened definitions have not been explicitly addressed prior to this work. We emphasize that our enhancement is safe and free, in that the smoothness is acquired via the redundancy of secret key while the anonymity is related to the property of algorithm SampB. It is also interesting to note that when reducing the indistinguishability of (IB)-HPS to the underlying assumptions, the hard instance is usually embedded into msk. This explains the difficulty of constructing IBE that allows leakage on msk via the methodology of hash proof system.
The relationship between smoothness and anonymity. In the cases of HPS and IB-HPS, when the algorithm SampB is independent of pk, smoothness instantly implies anonymity, in that the sample x does not contain any information of pk (IHF(id)) and the corresponding hashing value y is pseudo-random in Y . This observation provides us a simple approach to attain anonymity for many encryption schemes. 4 The instantiations presented in subsections 5.1, 8.2 8.3, 8.5, 8.6 exactly follow this approach. However, there do exist anonymous (IB)-HPS falling outside this approach, for instance, the IB-HPS underlying the Gentry IBE [Gen06] does not adapt this approach but is anonymous, as we showed in subsection 8.4. We also stress that smoothness does not always guarantee anonymity, for example, the IB-HPS that underlying the IBE scheme [CDRW10] is smooth but not anonymous, as we show in subsection 8.1.
Chosen-ciphertext security. In the main body of this paper, we restrict our attention to (leakage-resilient) security against only chosen-plaintext attacks. Technically, there are two generic method to bootstrap the security to the setting of (adaptive) chosen-ciphertext attacks. As indicated in [NS09] , Naor-Yung "double encryption" [DDN00] can also be used as a generic transform from CPA-security to CCA-security in the presence of key-leakage. However, this approach is only of theoretical interest in that the generic non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs are generally inefficient. From the practical aspect, we note that Cramer and Shoup [CS02] already presented a direct and elegant construction of CCA-secure PKE from HPS. In more details, except a smooth PHF H from X to Y (which is sufficient to yield CPA-secure PKE), a corresponding PHFH from X × M toỸ satisfying universal 2 property is also needed. One then can obtain a CCA-secure PKE by using H andH to perform "double encryption"-like operation. We observe that universal 2 (see definition in [CS02] ) is a much stronger notion than smoothness. Intuitively, for the distribution of y = H sk (x) conditioned on some fixed pk = α(sk), universal property requires that for every point x ∈ X\L the distribution is close to the uniform, while smooth property just requires that for almost every point x ∈ X\L the distribution is close to the uniform. It is also interesting to realize that the compatibility between projection and universality in the original HPS comes from the fact that L and X\L are disjointed. In the context of our generalization, we do not require the partition on X. Alternatively, we re-define the projection and smoothness with respect to distributions A and B over X, and |A| and |B| are not necessarily to be disjointed. Therefore, the projection and universality contradict with each other when the supports of A and B are identical (e.g. the case of lattice-based HPS shown in subsection 5.1). However, it might still be possible to construct a HPS satisfying approximate projection and universality simultaneously when |A| ∩ |B| is not empty (the situation that the action of H sk on |A| ∩ |B| is completely undetermined, and Pr[x ∈ |A| ∩ |B| : x ← A] is negligible.). We left concrete construction of such generalized (IB)-HPS as an open problem.
Extensions. Our generalization idea extends naturally to many variants of (IB)-HPS. Most notably, in the dual HPS introduced in [Wee12] , the set Π Y (corresponding to YES instances) and Π N (corresponding to NO instances) are required to be disjointed, and the indistinguishability is respect to two uniform distributions over them. However, such restrictions makes the instantiation from LWE presented in [Wee12, Section 8] do not fit the original paradigm of dual HPS exactly. Similar to the case of (IB)-HPS, these restrictions are not necessary in essence, it is thus reasonable to generalize dual HPS by centring around distribution distinguish problem instead of subset membership problem. Interestingly, the generalized dual HPS immediately implies almost-always LTDFs, which is a slightly relaxed definition of LTDFs suggested by Peikert and Waters [PW08] .
